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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In a tour de force, Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman advance the bold 
and sweeping thesis that health care law and policy systematically favor those 
who are relatively well-off to the detriment of the less fortunate, especially 
lower-income payers of health insurance premiums.1  Surprisingly, this 
regressivity can be seen both in market-oriented features of public policy as 
well as in many policies that seem on first appearance to be more progressive in 
spirit.  Most disturbing is the realization that the current system is not only 
regressive in many ways, but it is perversely or doubly so in the sense that lower-
income working people with more or less standard health coverage are (1) 
contributing disproportionate shares of their incomes to pay for more and 
better-quality health care than most of them would reasonably choose to buy if 
given a choice with costs in view, and (2) getting less benefit from their 
insurance coverage than are their more fortunate coworkers, despite paying the 
same premiums.  Thus, social inequity exists both in what people pay and in 
what they receive. 
Recognition of these inequities should galvanize policy analysts from all 
parts of the socio-political spectrum to re-examine both the current situation 
and their favored reforms, with an eye toward determining which features 
exacerbate or ameliorate these distributive injustices.  Some objectionable 
features may be unavoidable, others may be regressive only from a perspective 
that presupposes ideal alternatives that are unrealistic, whereas others may be 
rectifiable in some fashion.  In short, observing the distributive features of 
health care delivery and finance is a critical starting point for deeper 
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 1. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) In American Health Care, 
69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (Autumn 2006). 
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understanding, but this does little to determine what can and should be changed 
and how. 
Nevertheless, change is inevitable.  It is seemingly the only constant in 
health care financing over the past fifty years.  During that time, health 
insurance surfaced and spread.  It became more and more generous and 
unaffordable, and was eventually followed by managed-care restrictions on 
patients’ choice of physicians and their choice of treatments, which produced 
widespread backlash and so was neutered.  As inflation in health care spending 
continues apace, the current trend is “consumer-driven health care” (CDHC).  
In various forms, it requires insured patients to pay a major—or the entire—
portion of their own medical costs out-of-pocket or from a designated savings 
account.2  The most visible signs of this intensifying consumerism are the 
generously tax-sheltered “health savings accounts” (HSAs) authorized by 
recent federal legislation.3  HSAs can be used to pay for medical costs not 
covered by insurance if they are linked with “catastrophic” insurance policies 
that have annual deductibles in the range of $1000 to $10,000.4 
HSAs and other forms of patient cost-sharing embrace a much more 
explicitly tiered approach to health care finance and delivery.  These 
innovations therefore represent at least one version of the more differentiated 
coverage that Havighurst and Richman would apparently like to see.  Under the 
deeply tiered approach they favor, rather than requiring everyone to contribute 
roughly equal amounts for essentially identical coverage—which in fact is less 
valuable to some than to others—people would purchase and pay for the level 
of care they actually receive, at widely varying levels of value and cost. 5  To 
invoke an oft-used metaphor, instead of requiring everyone to pay for a 
Cadillac while some drive only a Corolla, each would more or less pay for what 
he or she drives.  Ideally, public or employer subsidies would enable everyone 
 
 2. See generally CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS 
AND POLICY MAKERS (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., 2004) (providing extensive overview of consumer-
driven health care policies); James C. Robinson, Reinvention of Health Insurance in the Consumer Era, 
291 JAMA 1880 (2004) (same); Amy B.  Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health 
Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777 (2006) (analyzing the claims made by proponents of consumer-driven 
health care). 
 3. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 § 1201, 26 
U.S.C.A. § 223 (2003). 
 4. Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the 
Future of American Health Care, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 536, 551–52 (2005); Edward J. Larson & Marc 
Dettmann, The Impact of HSAs on Health Care Reform: Preliminary Results After One Year, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1097 (2006).  These numbers are not precise because they are adjusted each year 
for inflation. 
 5. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 79 (supporting “proposals to let consumers . . . 
choose more or less freely the style of health care they want to purchase for their families”).  To the 
surprise of many, they are also amenable to a single-payer government insurance system.  See id. 
(“Indeed, we would not object if our [arguments] . . . were cited as a reason to adopt a monolithic 
national health program.”).  Still, they insist that those who are well-off remain free to purchase 
supplemental coverage that provides a higher tier of service.  See id. (expressing openness to “scrapping 
private health insurance altogether (except insofar as it might supplement the national system’s 
coverage)”). 
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to afford some form of safe and decent transportation, but some people may 
ride the bus or choose mini-scooters while others are willing to pay more to 
enjoy luxury vehicles. 
This article surveys a partial range of legal and regulatory issues that might 
arise if this scenario were realized.  The focus here is on the private-law issues 
of contract and tort and on the regulation of private insurance.6  Part II 
considers whether cross-subsidies in providers’ prices and insurance premiums 
are properly viewed as regressive or progressive and surveys possible legal 
barriers to either reducing or increasing these cross-subsidies.  Part III considers 
whether either contract or tort law requires providers to deliver more health 
care than people are actually willing to pay for.  In the end, this brief survey 
concludes that neither existing insurance regulatory policy nor common-law 
precedents pose major obstacles to consumer-driven health care. 
II 
LESS REGRESSIVE HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
Private-sector payment for medical services might be made more 
progressive in two broad ways.  Either providers could adjust their prices to 
reflect patients’ ability to pay or health insurance premiums could reflect 
patients’ income in some fashion.  This section explores various versions of each 
possibility. 
A. Providers’ Prices 
Havighurst and Richman focus principally on perceived injustices to 
premium payers, failing to discuss what many people otherwise regard as the 
primary redistributive mechanism in payment for health care—discriminatory 
pricing by hospitals.  Instead of accepting the conventional view that hospitals 
engage in Robin Hood-style redistribution from those with greater ability to 
pay to those with less, they argue that the system is essentially regressive 
because “ability to pay” is most often a function of having private health 
insurance—a variable not closely correlated with individual income or wealth.7  
Thus, they contend that most of the cost of hospitals’ good works, however 
worthy they may be—something they are unwilling to concede—are ultimately 
borne more or less equally by premium payers, like a regressive “head tax” that 
is imposed without regard to relative ability to pay.8  Many readers, accustomed 
to viewing hospital cross-subsidies as distributionally progressive, will find this 
argument hard to swallow.  However, despite its unconventionality—and 
 
 6. Others in this symposium consider public insurance and government regulation of providers.  
See, e.g., Christopher J. Conover, Distributional Considerations in the Overregulation of Health 
Professionals, Health Facilities, and Health Plans, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181 (Autumn 2006); 
Jonathan Oberlander, The Political Economy of Unfairness in U.S. Health Policy, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 245 (Autumn 2006).  
 7. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 28. 
 8. Id. 
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indeed because of this quality—the Havighurst–Richman hypothesis deserves 
to be taken seriously. 
Nevertheless, in concentrating on what they see as hospitals’ ability to 
overcharge insured patients, Havighurst and Richman give very little attention 
to another regressive feature of modern health care finance—namely, that 
hospitals routinely charge uninsured patients considerably more than insured 
patients for exactly the same services.  Rather than inflate prices by roughly the 
same amount for all paying patients, hospitals instead charge their well-insured 
patients prices that are closer to their actual costs and load a great deal more of 
the burden of cross-subsidies on the smaller portion of patients who are without 
insurance or who are seeking care outside their health plan’s network.9  The 
magnitude of price discrimination against these disadvantaged patients can be 
staggering, with their bills amounting to several times what insurers pay on 
behalf of their subscribers for identical care.10 
These bizarre pricing practices result from a combination of market and 
regulatory factors.11  Although a full analysis is too complex to undertake here, 
the net result appears to be a perversely regressive pricing system that charges 
much more, not the same or less, to those who, because they lack insurance, are 
far less able to pay for hospital services.  This unfairness receives only passing 
notice by Havighurst and Richman, yet it would seem to be one they should 
decry as much as they decry the unfairness of the public-good burden imposed 
on insured patients.12  Instead, Havighurst and Richman, contending that many 
uninsured are “uninsured by choice” and have “more money in their pockets” 
by virtue of not paying insurance premiums,13 seem bent on focusing attention 
away from the uninsured and on emphasizing the share of the public-good 
burden that falls on the working middle and lower-middle classes.  This focus 
leaves the particular plight of unavoidably uninsured patients as a matter 
needing further discussion in this symposium. 
The legal legitimacy of price discrimination against the uninsured is being 
attacked in class action lawsuits across the country that accuse tax-exempt 
hospitals of failing to live up to their charitable missions.  So far, most of these 
 
 9. Christopher P. Tompkins, Stuart H. Altman & Efrat Eilat, The Precarious Pricing System for 
Hospital Services, 25 HEALTH AFF. 45, 52 (2006). 
 10. Kenneth T. Bowden, Determining a Reasonable Price for Health Care in the United States: Is 
This Possible?, 34 BRIEF 26, 28 (2005); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos 
Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57, 62 (2006); Julie Appleby, Hospitals Sock Uninsured with 
Much Bigger Bills, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2004, at B1; Lucette Lagnado, Anatomy of a Hospital Bill, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2004, at B1. 
 11. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 13–82.  These factors include the following: (1) the 
charitable mission of most nonprofit hospitals, which encourages them to support various collective 
goods, (2) the ability of public and private insurers to insist on deep discounts that eliminate pricing 
support for collective goods, and (3) hospitals’ market power over the uninsured.  Also relevant are 
regulatory barriers to hospitals regularly offering non-negotiated price discounts. 
 12. See id. at 71–72. 
 13. Id. at 72. 
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suits have been dismissed on procedural or technical grounds,14 but some early 
rulings have recognized a valid claim in allegations that hospitals charge 
uninsured patients a lot more than insured patients.15  Additional support for 
attacking hospital price discrimination comes from litigation between insurers 
and hospitals under managed care plans.  When a hospital treats patients 
covered by insurers with whom it does not have a contract, courts have ruled 
that the hospital cannot charge its full list prices but instead must give a 
discount that reflects what that hospital usually is paid.16 Under the pressure of 
this litigation, public scrutiny, and congressional hearings, hospitals are rapidly 
changing their billing practices and adopting sliding-scale charge systems that 
give lower-income, uninsured patients roughly the same level of discounts as 
insured patients.17 
Charging each patient roughly equal amounts for equal care would solve the 
perverse regressivity of current hospital pricing, but it would not restore the 
progressivity that once prevailed.  Starting as far back as the Code of 
Hammurabi18 and until about fifty years ago, health care providers were 
required to explicitly subsidize services for poor patients.  Under ancient 
Roman law and in Renaissance England, physicians,19 like barristers,20 were 
 
 14. For instance, federal courts have refused to certify a class, have found an absence of any federal 
cause of action, or have declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law breach-of-contract claims.  
Moreover, courts have dismissed some contract claims on res judicata grounds when the claim was 
previously settled through normal collection processes.  Richard G. Stuhan, Decisions to Date on 
Dispositive Motions in the Charity Care Litigation, HEALTH LAWYER NEWS, Sept. 2005, at 18. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Temple Univ. Hosp. v. Healthcare Management Alternatives, 832 A.2d 501, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2003); River Park Hosp. v. Bluecross Blueshield of Tenn., 173 S.W.3d 43, 58 (Tenn. 2003). 
 17. Bowden, supra note 10, at 29; Reinhardt, supra note 10, at 62; Tomkins, Altman & Eilat, supra 
note 9, at 53. 
 18. Enacted about 2030 B. C., the Code of Hammurabi declared, for instance: 
If a doctor has cured the shattered limb of a gentleman or has cured the diseased bowel, the 
patient shall give five shekels of silver to the doctor.  If it is the son of a poor man he shall give 
three shekels of silver.  If a gentleman’s servant, the master of the slave shall give two shekels 
of silver to the doctor. 
Hubert W. Smith, Legal Responsibility for Medical Malpractice, 116 JAMA 942, 943 (1941).  It is not 
entirely clear, though, whether these rules were based on ability to pay rather than on the social value 
of the service to different classes of patients. 
 19. The historical and legal bases for barring physicians from suing for fees has not been studied as 
thoroughly as it has been for lawyers.  For physicians, the best scholarly discussion is well over a 
century old.  JOHN ORDRONAUX, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MEDICINE IN ITS RELATIONS TO THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS, TORTS, AND EVIDENCE 10–14, 34–41 (Arno Press 1973) (1869).  It appears that 
medieval Roman law codified the ancient practice based in part on concerns that physicians were 
overcharging their patients.  THOMAS PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS: OR A CODE OF INSTITUTES AND 
PRECEPTS ADAPTED TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 175–76 
(Birmingham: Classics of Medicine 1985) (1803).  In Renaissance England, the rule appears to be based 
more on the notion of legal recognition of professional norms, that is, refusing to find an implied 
promise to pay when the common practice at the time was to receive honoraria.  However, it seems 
there was no rule barring physicians from making and enforcing an express contract.  Id. at 177–78; 
Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 191, 237 (Lord Morris), 280 (Lord Upjohn) (H.L. 1967) (appeal taken 
from Eng.), overruled by Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v. Simons, (2000) 3 Eng. Rep. 673 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Scot.). 
 20. In ancient Rome, lawyers and other “liberal arts” practitioners from the nobility undertook 
service pursuant to a “mandate,” meaning that their services were required without compensation.  
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legally precluded from enforcing ordinary contracts for their fees because this 
was seen as inconsistent with their status as noble, learned professionals.  
Instead, physicians and barristers received voluntary honoraria21 and were 
expected to serve patients regardless of their ability to pay.22 
This honorarium or non-contractual doctrine was never adopted in the 
United States, where medical and legal services have always had a contractual 
legal status.23  However, an explicitly progressive pricing practice was required 
by U.S. law through the middle of the twentieth century.24  Because physicians 
typically do not negotiate fees in advance with patients, when, prior to 
widespread insurance, physicians sued for fees, courts determined the implied 
payment terms according to what the suing physician and others in the 
community normally charged.  Part of that calculation was the accepted 
practice, prior to widespread insurance, of charging sliding-scale fees based on 
ability to pay.25  Almost all of this litigation focused on whether physicians could 
charge more to wealthier patients,26 but implicitly courts also required 
physicians to charge poor patients less. 
This legal regime, which has gone virtually unnoticed for over half a century, 
is truly extraordinary.  Nowhere else has the common law enforced a highly 
 
This understanding arose from the social order among the Roman nobility that regarded public service 
as one of the duties of citizenship and that assumed that other nobles would reciprocate in kind with 
their services, as the need arose.  See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 187–89 
(1962); ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 51–55 (1953); 
REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN 
TRADITION 413–20 (1996).  British barristers adopted the convention of voluntary honoraria rather 
than contractual fees, in part in order to elevate their social and professional standing over solicitors 
and attorneys.  J.H. BAKER, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 
119 (1986).  These legal characterizations were largely just formalities, however, in that both in England 
and in ancient Rome, lawyers usually expected to receive their standard payment before they took a 
case.  Also, they sometimes could sue for payment on legal grounds other than ordinary contract, such 
as quantum meruit (equity) or to enforce a sealed bond given in exchange for service.  Id. 
 21. Thomas Percival, for instance, in his seminal Medical Ethics, carefully refers to physicians’ 
payments as “pecuniary acknowledgements” rather than as fees, charges, or the like.  PERCIVAL, supra 
note 19, at 39–40, 174–79.  
 22. Lawyers never fully adopted this part of the creed.  Instead, the practice among barristers was 
to insist on payment of their usual fee in advance, before taking on a case.  Only in criminal cases were 
barristers required to work without pay.  This prepayment practice obviated the need to sue for fees, 
which legal historians speculate made it convenient for barristers to adopt the non-enforceability 
doctrine as a means of elevating their professional standing.  Later, barristers used the noncontractual 
basis of legal services to argue for immunity from tort liability.  See Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] 1 A.C. 
191 (H.L. 1967) (appeal taken from Eng.), overruled by Arthur J.S. Hall & Co. v. Simons, (2000) 3 Eng. 
Rep. 673 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.). 
 23. KENNETH ALLEN DEVILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
184 (1990); ORDRONAUX, supra note 19. 
 24. D.E. Evins, Annotation, Ability to Pay as Factor in Determining Reasonableness of Charge of 
Physician or Surgeon, 97 A.L.R.2d 1232 (1964). 
 25. See, e.g., Zumwalt v. Schwarz, 297 P. 608, 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (“[T]here is evidence of a 
recognized usage, which has grown into a custom, to graduate professional charges with reference to 
the financial condition of the patient . . . .”).  One widespread practice was to charge the patient one 
month of his or her salary for a major operation.  Houda v. McDonald, 294 P. 249, 251 (Wash. 1930). 
 26. For instance, Citron v. Fields, 85 P.2d 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938), was a suit against the famous 
actor W.C. Fields for $12,000 in medical fees. 
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progressive pricing structure that requires service providers to cross-subsidize 
people who cannot pay as much.  From another vantage, however, this was not 
extraordinary at all.  Courts simply used prevailing professional practices and 
ethical norms to fill in the unstated price terms of implicit service contracts.  
Once written insurance policies usurped these implicit agreements, the legal 
framework as well as professional practices quickly changed.27  Professional 
ethics and public policy remain essentially the same, however.  Physicians are 
still encouraged to reduce or waive fees for patients who cannot pay,28 and 
hospitals are expected to do the same in order to justify charitable tax 
exemption.  To make up the difference, they must charge somewhat more to 
patients of means.  Building these subsidies into provider pricing may be 
economically inefficient, but, still, it is the progressive pricing system that is 
encouraged by many health policy proponents. 
B. Insurance Premiums 
Regarding health insurance pricing, Havighurst and Richman emphasize the 
regressive practice of charging lower-income subscribers the same as those with 
higher incomes, even though the latter tend to use more health services in 
similar circumstances, thereby taking disproportionate advantage of the 
collectively purchased coverage.29  They suggest that if employers would 
subdivide their insurance pools more or less by income class, individuals with 
different needs and preferences could then purchase appropriate coverage and 
pay more nearly for only what they get.30  Havighurst and Richman perceive 
such regressivity even when employers offer their workers a variety of health 
care options, because few employers require employees wanting higher-cost 
coverage to pay its full incremental cost.31  The issue they identify has not been 
much recognized, yet it is a potentially important one. 
What Havighurst and Richman leave largely unexplored, however, is the 
fundamental question of what constitutes regressivity in the pricing of private 
health insurance.  Lower-income workers tend to have poorer health and 
greater health needs, necessitating consumption that offsets, at least in part, the 
 
 27. Although courts have not specifically repudiated the rule that considers patients’ ability to pay, 
the last reported case following this principle is Spencer v. West, 126 So. 2d 423, 426–27 (La. Ct. App. 
1960).  The principle was briefly mentioned in one unreported case since then.  Anticaglia v. Lynch, No. 
90C-11-175, 1992 WL 138983, at *19 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 1992).  Most modern cases simply state 
that patients owe reasonable rates based on prevailing charges.  E.g., Rush Presbyterian-St. Luke’s 
Med. Ctr. v. Hellenic Republic, 980 F.2d 449, 453–54 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 28. See, e.g., AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, 
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS Op. 8.055 (2005) (“Physicians 
have a professional obligation to provide care to those in need, regardless of ability to pay, particularly 
to those in need of urgent care.”); id. Op. 9.065 (“Each physician has an obligation to share in providing 
care to the indigent . . . .  Caring for the poor should be a regular part of the physician’s practice 
schedule.”). 
 29. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 42. 
 30. Id. at 45–46. 
 31. Id. at 46–47. 
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tendency that concerns Havighurst and Richman.  In light of this difference in 
health status, many believe that employers’ large, community-rated insurance 
pools are more progressive than not.  Havighurst and Richman, however, rely 
mostly on evidence from Medicare and foreign health systems to suggest that 
the net effect in most employment settings is still likely to be regressive.32  In 
either event, the distributional effects of private health insurance merit further 
discussion in this symposium. 
In general, community rating is viewed as the most progressive way to price 
private insurance because it charges healthier people more in order to subsidize 
the costs of the sick.33  In contrast, under a social or governmental insurance 
scheme, community rating would amount to a regressive “head tax” that 
charged everyone the same regardless of their ability to pay.  This difference in 
perspective arises from the different assumptions that attach to private versus 
public insurance.  Even though a flat amount for each person is a highly 
regressive form of taxation, this is the greatest extent of cross-subsidy that one 
can reasonably hope for in private insurance pools that are formed voluntarily 
through policies sold in a competitive marketplace.34  Still, such pooling 
inevitably combines lower users with higher users, charging each the same 
premium regardless of health.  To the extent lower users also have lower 
incomes, a form of regressivity exists that Havighurst and Richman hope to 
avoid. 
How this might happen depends on one’s source of insurance.  The private 
insurance market is divided between products that are and are not “medically 
underwritten.”35  Insurers medically underwrite insurance that is purchased 
individually or as part of a small employer group but not insurance purchased 
through large employer groups.  These two market divisions are governed by 
entirely different economic principles and legal regimes.36  Large group 
insurance is “experience-rated,” meaning that insurers—or employers in the 
case of self-insured plans—estimate medical expenses for the group as a whole 
based on historical trends and demographics rather than focus on the health 
status of each member of the group.  Because the extent of regressivity depends 
on the context and the range of realistic options, these two market segments will 
be considered separately. 
1. Medically Underwritten Insurance 
If lower-income people used fewer medical resources, insurers might be 
expected to include income as a rating factor in their underwriting formulae.  
 
 32. Id. at 47–49. 
 33. See Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & 
L. 287 (1993) (stressing the social value of community rating). 
 34. See MARK A. HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 62–76 (1994). 
 35. “Medical underwriting” means that insurers in some fashion assess and price the health risk of 
each subscriber.  Id. at 16–17. 
 36. Mark A. Hall, The Geography of Health Insurance Regulation: A Guide to Identifying, 
Exploiting, and Policing Market Boundaries, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2000, at 173, 173. 
07__HALL.DOC 3/7/2007  3:56 PM 
Autumn 2006] PAYING FOR WHAT YOU GET 167 
However, lower-income subscribers also tend to be less healthy on average and 
therefore have more need to seek medical care.37  On balance, then, income 
alone is not as strong a predictor of expected health care expenses as are other 
available rating factors, such as age and prior use of health care services.  
Therefore, the failure of insurers to adjust premiums for income is not due 
primarily to regulatory barriers. 38  In most states, there are no legal obstacles 
preventing insurers from adjusting insurance premiums for individual (“non-
group”) insurance according to subscribers’ income.39  More restrictions exist in 
the small-group market, where states typically do not allow rating by income.  
States tend, however, to exclude rating practices engaged in by only a minority 
of firms and to allow those factors that most established insurers would prefer 
to use.40  Therefore, it is unlikely that these regulations are blocking insurers 
from using important rating factors other than individual health status. 
This regulatory issue is largely beside the point, however, because 
Havighurst and Richman do not actually advocate charging lower-income users 
less for equivalent coverage.41 Instead, they would like to allow those who use 
less health care, or who can only afford less, to purchase less coverage at a 
lower price.42  In other words, they call for the separation of broad community-
rated pools of comprehensive coverage into smaller pools consisting of more 
widely differentiated coverage, allowing each pool to set its premiums according 
to what is actuarially fair for that pool.43  This is in fact happening in the form of 
high-deductible health plans that meet the federal requirements for tax-
protected health savings accounts (HSAs).  If insurance policies have 
deductibles that range from approximately $1000 to $5000 for single coverage 
or $2000 to $10,000 for family coverage, then expenditures subject to the 
deductible can be paid through a tax-sheltered savings account that excludes 
contributions and earnings thereon from taxable income.44 
These high-deductible plans are often priced as Havighurst and Richman 
would want, at a level that reflects actual utilization of health care services by 
their particular pool of subscribers.45  A purer, community-rated approach 
 
 37. John D. Graham et al., Poorer is Riskier, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 333, 334 (1992); Paula M. Lantz et 
al., Socioeconomic Factors, Health Behaviors, and Mortality: Results from a Nationally Representative 
Prospective Study of U.S. Adults, 279 JAMA 1703–08 (1998). 
 38. Another possible explanation is that lower-income people are less likely to purchase insurance, 
so insurers may consider that it is not worthwhile to add that factor into an already-complex rating 
formula.  
 39. Insurance pricing is regulated by state, not federal, law.  State law regulates small-group 
insurance rating in much greater detail than the rating of individual (“non-group”) insurance.  See 
Mark A. Hall, The Structure and Enforcement of Health Insurance Rating Reforms, 37 INQUIRY 376, 
376–77 (2001) (describing rating rules and practices for the small-group and individual markets). 
 40. See Mark A. Hall, The Political Economics of Health Insurance Market Reform, HEALTH AFF., 
Summer 1992, at 108, 119 (discussing the insurance industry’s influence over market reforms). 
 41. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 49. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. at 45. 
 44. Id. at 38 n.94. 
 45. Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven Health 
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would distinguish the utilization-restraining effects of higher cost-sharing from 
the “selection effect” resulting from healthier patients tending to choose leaner 
and less-expensive coverage.  In other words, according to the spirit of 
community rating, lower costs due to cost-constrained use of services would 
translate into lower premiums, but lower costs due to subscribers’ better health 
would not.  Seldom do regulators actually require insurers to make this 
distinction, however.  Instead, they allow insurers to price policies according to 
the net utilization under each benefit structure, regardless of what drives the 
utilization differences.46  As a result, if lower-income people were to select these 
high-deductible policies disproportionately, they would not receive as deep a 
discount as they might deserve.  In effect, their poorer health status would 
offset, at least to some extent, their cost-constrained demand for services.  It 
would be more progressive to give lower-income subscribers the benefit of their 
lower demand for services without penalizing them for suffering poorer health.  
However, it may not be feasible for insurers to make, or regulators to enforce, 
this difficult actuarial distinction. 
2. Employer Pools 
So far, this overview has considered only insurance plans that are sold to 
individuals or small employers, for it is only in these market segments that 
insurers assess the likely costs of each potential subscriber.  Within larger 
employer pools, however, insurers calculate only the total costs for the entire 
group based on recent utilization and leave to employers the decision of how to 
allocate these costs across the workforce. 47  Legally, employers are largely free 
to do what they want.48  Their decisions are influenced mainly by labor-market 
economics, workplace equities, and practical administrative considerations.  
The most visible way in which workers bear the cost of health benefits is 
through the portion of the premium they are required to pay themselves if they 
elect to receive health benefits.49  That portion is typically calculated as a simple 
 
Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 413–14 (2005). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See MARK V. PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 86–91 (1997) (detailing the use of 
community rating in allocating health insurance costs); W.E. Encinosa & T.M. Selden, Designing 
Employer Health Benefits for a Heterogeneous Workforce: Risk Adjustment and Its Alternatives, 38 
INQUIRY 270 (2001) (describing various options for employers to allocate health care costs among 
employees). 
 48. As surveyed in Henry Greely, The Regulation of Private Health Insurance, in HEALTH CARE 
CORPORATE LAW: FORMATION AND REGULATION 8-1 (Mark Hall ed., 1993), federal law preempts 
much of this arena from state regulatory oversight and asserts little direct substantive regulation of its 
own.  Employers’ decisions to offer fringe benefits are affected indirectly by federal tax law, but tax law 
does not require employers to provide equal benefits to all workers.  Instead, unless they self-insure, 
employers may favor some employees over others.  RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 125–29 (2004). 
 49. As Havighurst and Richman discuss, economists argue that workers effectively pay for all 
premium costs through reduced wages, because total payroll costs are constrained by market forces, 
and employers are economically agnostic as to whether payroll expenses are paid in the form of wages 
or benefits.  Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 44–45.  Therefore, it largely does not matter how 
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average cost per person in the workforce, without adjusting for health risk or 
demographic factors—a method equivalent to pure community rating.  
Employers could, but generally do not, charge lower-wage employees less for 
equivalent coverage. 50  Some employers do, however, charge workers at least 
somewhat less when they opt for lower-cost coverage, such as a Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO) policy rather than a traditional policy.  
Thus, as employers begin to offer HSA-qualifying high-deductible plans, they 
are free to, and usually do, charge less to employees who opt for this cheaper 
coverage.51  Providing this lower-cost option moderates the regressive features 
that Havighurst and Richman identify.  Still, this is not as progressive as 
employers conceivably could become. 
One way employers might be even more progressive is to contribute more to 
the HSAs of workers who would be more disadvantaged by high-deductible 
insurance, such as those with chronic illness or those with lower wages.  Federal 
law prohibits this, however, by requiring that employers make equal 
contributions to the HSA of each worker if they contribute anything at all.52  
Insisting on strict uniformity most likely reflects a desire to avoid favoring more 
highly compensated employees.  Obviously, such a policy does not result from, 
but rather is at odds with, a desire to be more generous to disadvantaged 
employees.  Therefore, it would make sense from a progressivity standpoint to 
amend this uniformity requirement accordingly.53 
A similar strategy employers could use to make consumer-driven health 
insurance less regressive is to lessen the cost-sharing elements for lower-income 
workers.  Instead of either providing low-wage workers less generous insurance 
that is less expensive or charging these workers less for equivalent coverage, 
 
much of compensation goes toward health insurance.  This argument is most convincing, however, only 
for aggregate payroll costs.  The economic effects of allocating these costs among classes of employees 
remain more speculative.  As Havighurst and Richman argue, it remains unproven whether having 
lower costs for the health benefits of one subset of workers would result in higher wages for those 
workers or whether the opposite would be true.  Id. at 46.  For instance, employers generally do not pay 
some equally qualified workers more simply because they elect not to receive health benefits.  
Therefore, it is relevant to focus on the portion of premiums charged explicitly to workers. 
 50. See Thomas Rice & Kenneth E. Thorpe, Income-Related Cost Sharing in Health Insurance, 
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1993, at 21, 21 (recommending that employers tie cost-sharing to employees’ 
income level); see also Veronica Goff, Consumer Cost Sharing in Private Health Insurance: On the 
Threshold of Change, NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM ISSUE BRIEF, May 2004, at 8, available at 
http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/ IB798_CostSharing.pdf; Sally Trude & Joy M. Grossman, Patient Cost-
Sharing Innovations: Promises and Pitfalls, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE ISSUE BRIEF, 
Jan. 2004, at 3, available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/643/. 
 51. Gary Claxton et al., What High-Deductible Plans Look Like: Findings from a National Survey 
of Employers, 2005 HEALTH AFF. (WEB EXCLUSIVES) W5-434, W-439. 
 52. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980G (2003); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, HSA Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/faq_basics.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2006). 
 53. Recently, President Bush proposed allowing employers to make higher contributions to the 
HSAs of chronically ill employees.  Press Release, White House Office of the Press Sec’y, State of the 
Union: Affordable and Accessible Health Care (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2006/01/20060131-7.html.  This proposal does not include different contributions based 
on income, however.  Currently, this can be done only through a “section 125 cafeteria plan,” also 
known as a flexible spending account.  See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 52. 
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employers could charge lower-income workers the same as others but provide 
them more generous coverage that reduces their net out-of-pocket expenses.  
This could be done in the form of equivalent insurance that has lower, although 
still high, deductibles.  One reason lower-income people use health benefits less 
is that any given deductible or copayment is a greater deterrent to their seeking 
care than it is for those with more money to spare—a phenomenon that 
economists refer to as a “wealth effect.”  The wealth effect is a major reason 
lower-income people use health insurance less and is therefore a major 
contributor to the regressive effect that Havighurst and Richman critique.  
Adjusting deductibles or copayments to compensate for the wealth effect is 
conceptually a relatively simple fix for the problem and one that appears to be 
legally permissible. 54 
In sum, in the complex world of health insurance regulation and employer-
sponsored health insurance, few laws actually restrain insurers and employers 
from adopting more progressive insurance-pricing practices.55  Instead, as 
Havighurst and Richman thoroughly document, plenty of legal and regulatory 
features artificially and inefficiently increase the overall costs of health care, 
thereby exacerbating the extent of regressivity that tends to exist naturally.56  If 
those larger problems were solved, however, there would be few legal barriers 
to making the financing of private insurance more progressive.  Indeed, high-
deductible health insurance holds some prospect for both reducing overall 
medical costs and offering more affordable coverage for lower cost. 
III 
LESS EXPENSIVE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY 
Havighurst and Richman’s primary concern is the employer-based tax 
subsidy, which induces overly generous health insurance and thus excessive 
health care consumption.  Accordingly, their main remedies are aimed at 
allowing patients, if they choose, to receive a substantially less expensive—and 
presumably lower overall—standard of medical care than is currently required 
by contract or tort law.57  This same legal dilemma was posed previously by 
managed-care insurance, but for reasons thoroughly explained elsewhere, the 
managed-care movement never substantially changed medical standards of 
 
 54. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 52.  This would comply with requirements for HSAs 
so long as the lowest deductible meets the HSA floor.  For example, employers could give low-wage 
workers coverage with a $1000 deductible while giving high-wage workers coverage with a $5000 
deductible—each group being charged the same amount for their coverage.  The only constraint set by 
HSA law is that if the employer contributes to the HSA, it must contribute equal amounts for each 
employee and no more than the deductible amount.  See supra text accompanying note 52.  Therefore, 
under this example, employers could fund only one-fifth of the deductible for higher-wage workers. 
 55. The most notable example is the nondiscrimination requirement for employer contributions to 
HSAs, which poses a regulatory barrier to implementing these new benefit structures in a way that does 
not overburden lower-income workers. 
 56. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 58–71. 
 57. Id. at 66. 
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care.58  Therefore, the academic debates over whether law could and should 
allow these changes proved to be largely moot.59  Health policy is now looking 
to consumer-driven ideas to force more of the kind of health care resource 
allocation that has been minimized for the past half-century.60  If these new 
forms of insurance take hold, they will squarely raise whether providers legally 
may, on account of the cost, render medical services that are “substandard” in 
some sense or that sacrifice some substantial measure of medical benefit. 
As Havighurst and Richman demonstrate, many aspects of law require 
similar—or even uniform—standards of medical care.61  These laws developed 
over the past few decades when uniform comprehensive insurance prevailed 
and lack of insurance was an exception that law could accommodate without 
needing to vary basic legal standards.62  In the consumer-driven era of high-
deductible health insurance, however, limitations in insurance will become 
much more widespread.  Most patients with high-deductible policies will pay for 
most of their treatment costs out of pocket because most people’s annual 
medical expenses will not exceed the high-deductible threshold.63  When entirely 
out-of-pocket payment becomes commonplace, will the law continue to insist 
on similar medical care for everyone?  Thoroughly exploring this broad 
question would require delving into many areas of legal doctrine.  Here, space 
permits a brief survey of only two of the most prominent issues: first, the 
contractual standard of medical necessity and, second, the tort liability standard 
of care. 
A. Contractual Medical Necessity 
There is no strong reason to expect that consumer-driven health care 
(CDHC) will produce substantial changes in the contractual definition of 
medical necessity.  The thrust of CDHC is to retain standard insurance for 
“catastrophic” expenses that exceed amounts for which most people are able to 
 
 58. See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Is the Health Care Revolution Finished?—A Foreword, 65 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Autumn 2002) (introducing this symposium discussing the failed potential 
of managed care). 
 59. Naturally, it is possible that managed care failed to drive substantial change because law was 
not more conducive to change, but most observers believe that managed care’s failures were market-
driven or were related to federal tax policy.  See Mark A. Hall, The Death of Managed Care: A 
Regulatory Autopsy, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 427 (2005) (detailing the reasons for the downfall 
of managed care).  Therefore, the extent of legal resistance was never seriously tested in many arenas.  
See generally PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE 
MANAGED CARE ERA (2002) (analyzing legal responses to various aspects of managed care). 
 60. See text accompanying supra notes 2–4. 
 61. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 63. 
 62. See generally Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical 
Development and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J.L., MED., & ETHICS 141 (1993). 
 63. See Mark A. Hall & Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving Managed Care with Health Savings 
Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1491 (2005) (documenting the highly skewed distribution of health 
care spending that produces this phenomenon).  It is also the case, however, that most medical 
expenditures will still be insured.  This apparent paradox is explained by the fact that the minority of 
people who exceed their deductible will have medical costs far above average, due to the highly-skewed 
distribution of medical problems across the population.  Id. at 1494. 
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budget on an annual basis.64  Below that threshold, people are expected to make 
their own decisions about what is medically necessary.  Above the threshold, 
insurers’ coverage decisions will be subject to essentially the same legal 
oversight and market forces that currently prevail.  Under managed care, there 
were forceful arguments that insurers should and would enforce more stringent 
cost-effectiveness standards,65 but this did not come to pass.  If the basic 
contractual standards of medical necessity did not materially change under 
managed-care insurance, this change is certainly not likely to happen under 
consumer-driven health insurance, particularly as managed-care restrictions are 
loosened.  The basic philosophy of CDHC is to reduce insurer oversight of 
medical-care delivery and place most decisions in the hands of patients and 
their physicians.  This goal is not advanced by greatly tightening the 
conventional definition of medical necessity.  Moreover, insurers are generally 
averse to reformulating their contracts and actuarial calculations to incorporate 
new legal concepts that have not yet been tested in court.  Innovating insurers 
bear the risk of any legal setbacks or financial miscalculations, but any successes 
in establishing favorable law or addressing market problems can easily be 
replicated by their competitors.  This is not a recipe for fundamental or radical 
change. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that the meaning of “medical necessity” in 
particular cases will evolve incrementally under high-deductible insurance 
toward substantially more cost-conservative standards of care.  This is true for 
the following reasons.  First, for treatment subject to the deductible, medical 
necessity will be decided primarily by cost-sensitized patients in consultation 
with their physicians.  Accordingly, prevailing professional practices, to which 
the contractual standard of medical necessity refers, will likely incorporate 
much more cost-sensitized norms than is currently the case.  When insurance 
applies, these will become the same norms that insurers enforce, thus giving 
insurers a broader base of support in actual clinical practice to apply cost-
effective standards of medical necessity. 
 
 64. See sources cited supra notes 2–4. 
 65. E.g., CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS 
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 89–110 (1995); Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health 
Insurers’ Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637 (1992).  Although this failure to 
innovate may be due in significant part to regulatory barriers, it may also be due in large part to the 
important jurisprudential, relational, and expressive functions served by the standard medical-necessity 
concept. See Kathy Cerminara,  Dealing with Dying: How Insurers Can Help Patients Seeking Last-
Chance Therapies (Even when the Answer Is “No”), 15 HEALTH MATRIX 285 (2005); William M. Sage, 
Managed Care’s Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative 
Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 600–45 (2003).  Health insurance contracts cover 
complex professional judgments made in an almost infinite array of uncertain circumstances.  
Therefore, they partake heavily of “relational contracting” features that are difficult or impossible to 
specify in advance.  In general legal theory, one solution is to contract for a broad existing professional 
norm and to leave specification and application to largely noncontractual processes.  See Symposium, 
Relational Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2000) (detailing various 
applications of relational contract theory).  This solution has prevailed under many types of health 
insurance for half a century, and it is highly doubtful that consumer-driven insurance will suddenly 
cause a radical change. 
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Second, when disputes over insurance coverage are litigated, courts should 
be less likely under consumer-driven plans to take such a harsh view of insurers’ 
or self-funded employers’66 motives for denying coverage.  This point can be 
appreciated by exploring the two different circumstances in which coverage 
disputes likely will arise under high-deductible plans:  when treatment is 
covered by the deductible, and when it is not.  Insurers will sometimes deny 
medical necessity for expenditures that are entirely subject to the deductible 
even though the insurer is not obligated in any event.67  This is because medical 
necessity still determines whether these initial expenditures count toward the 
deductible each year, and the deductible determines insurers’ responsibility for 
costs above the deductible; therefore, insurers retain some stake in reviewing 
medical necessity below the deductible. 68  It is likely, however, that such reviews 
will be done retrospectively, after treatment, rather than requiring patients to 
obtain permission first.69  In addition, patients will be paying for these services 
regardless of the outcome of the dispute, so the dispute affects only the 
insurer’s future contingent financial liability.  Courts therefore should view 
these coverage denials as mere determinations of financial responsibility rather 
than as denials of actual treatment, in contrast to the view that prevailed under 
managed-care insurance.70  This will lessen the pressure on courts to award 
coverage as a means of giving patients every possible chance to receive 
treatment that might work or that their doctors recommend. 
Even when framed simply as financial disputes, older cases have tended to 
strictly construe coverage language against insurers because of insurers’ self-
interest in avoiding financial liability.71  This strict scrutiny may abate somewhat 
if courts moderate their view of insurers’ stakes under high-deductible plans.  
When insurers deny medical necessity for treatment subject to a deductible, it is 
 
 66. Most of the points in this section regarding insurers apply as well to self-insured employers, to 
the extent they make their own coverage determinations or review those made for them by contracted 
insurance administrators. 
 67. These coverage denials will be less frequently appealed, however, because they will be for 
lower-cost treatments and because many patients will be able to pay for them in any event from their 
health savings accounts.  Underscoring the latter point, the tax qualification of HSAs extends to a 
broad list of health-related expenditures, regardless of whether they meet the stricter definition of 
“medical necessity” in the accompanying insurance policy.  See sources cited supra note 4. 
 68. Hall & Havighurst, supra note 63, at 1495. 
 69. Id. 
 70. For example, in Wickline v. State, the court reasoned: 
The stakes, the risks at issue, are much higher when a prospective cost containment review 
process is utilized than when a retrospective review process is used. 
A mistaken conclusion about medical necessity following retrospective review will result in 
the wrongful withholding of payment. An erroneous decision in a prospective review process, 
on the other hand, in practical consequences, results in the withholding of necessary care, 
potentially leading to a patient’s permanent disability or death. 
192 Cal. App. 3d 1630, 1634 (1986). 
 71. See Mark A. Hall, Teresa R. Smith, Michelle Naughton & Andrea Ebbers, Judicial Protection 
of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical Study of Insurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1055, 1063 (1996) (documenting legal factors in coverage disputes prior to widespread managed 
care). 
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primarily the patient’s money, not the insurer’s, that the insurer is attempting to 
save.  Such denials have only a possible impact on the insurer’s future liability if 
the deductible is met later in the year.  These factors are similar to ones that 
previously have convinced courts to find no or a lessened conflict of interest.72  
Under case law involving the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA)—which applies to employer-sponsored health insurance—the 
insurer’s conflict of interest heightens the court’s scrutiny of the insurer’s 
judgmental coverage decisions.73  When a conflict of interest is absent or lower, 
courts defer more readily to insurers’ medical necessity decisions.74  The same is 
true, at least to some extent, when state courts apply insurance contract law. 75  
Under high-deductible health insurance, when treatment costs are below the 
deductible, the insurer’s role is more akin to that of a “third-party 
administrator” for an employer plan that is self-funded—that is, the insurer is 
determining medical necessity as a contracted administrator rather than 
determining its own immediate financial liability.  When these same situations 
arise under ERISA, courts consistently find no substantial conflict of interest in 
the insurer. 76 
More often, however, insurers with high-deductible plans will continue to 
bear part or all of the immediate financial stakes when medical-necessity 
denials are challenged.  This is because appeals are more likely for denials with 
larger financial stakes that exceed the deductible threshold, such as denials for 
hospitalization costs.  In such cases it is difficult to predict whether the judicial 
view of insurers will moderate.  It is possible, however, that courts will see these 
situations as a hybrid between the situation just described (involving coverage 
denials below the deductible) and the overt conflict of interest under 
comprehensive, no-deductible insurance.  For instance, a $10,000 claim under a 
policy with a $5000 deductible would expose the insurer to only $5000 of 
potential liability.  If decided prior to treatment, a coverage denial might save 
the patient and the insurer $5000 each.77  In analogous circumstances under 
 
 72. See, e.g., Crossman v. Media Gen. Inc., 9 Fed. App’x 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding no 
conflict of interest when the employer paid benefits from a dedicated trust fund); Mers v. Marriott Int’l 
Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no 
conflict when the amount at stake is small compared to total assets available); Mitchell v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 437 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding no conflict of interest when the employer paid 
benefits from a dedicated trust fund); Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension Plan for 
Salaried Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1992) (ruling that a potential future benefit to the 
decisionmaker is not sufficient to create a conflict). 
 73. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989). 
 74. See generally Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 
50 AM. U. L. REV. 1083 (2001); Peter A. Meyers, Discretionary Language, Conflicts of Interest, and 
Standard of Review for ERISA Disability Plans, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 925 (2005). 
 75. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 65. 
 76. See cases cited supra note 72.  Leading cases also include Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 214 F.3d 377, 383–84 (3d Cir. 2000) and Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 
1561–62 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 77. Alternatively, an insurer might deny coverage because a different type of effective treatment is 
available that is substantially less costly yet still expensive.  If the alternative treatment still costs as 
much as the deductible, however, then the insurer would enjoy all the benefits of the denial, increasing 
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ERISA, the court’s level of scrutiny moderates following an explicitly sliding-
scale level of review that varies according to the extent of conflicted interest.78  
Viewing medical necessity determinations as entailing overlapping sets of 
interests, it is conceivable that courts might regard coverage denials as mutually 
beneficial attempts by insurers to make the best use of both the patient’s and 
their own funds. 
B. Liability Standard of Care 
As consumers buy more-limited insurance and insurers enforce those limits 
more aggressively, physicians will more frequently face the dilemma of treating 
patients whose insurance does not fully cover what physicians believe is 
medically optimal.  The above section explains that deficits in coverage can 
arise from two directions:  If insurance has high deductibles, most subscribers 
will pay for all of their treatment costs either out of pocket or from their 
designated savings accounts.79  Even when insurance applies, insurers might 
agree to cover fully only a less expensive version of treatment than the one the 
physician believes is best, such as a generic rather than a newly patented drug or 
an ultrasound rather than a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan.  These 
scenarios raise the question whether a physician is potentially liable if he 
delivers treatment that is less than optimal, assuming the patient can later show 
that the better treatment would have produced a better health outcome. 
Medical law does not provide a clear answer to this question.  In considering 
whether liability law should accommodate cost burdens, previous discussions 
have focused primarily on more extreme cases in which non-covered treatment 
is extraordinarily expensive or patients have few or no financial resources.80  
These are critical situations, but these extremes will not occur as often as the 
more routine, but still challenging, situations presenting a range of treatment 
options—all of which are at least somewhat affordable—the best of which cost 
substantially more than the others. 
Full analysis of this situation is complex, so in the space available here it 
helps to make these simplifying assumptions: (1) the patient could pay for the 
medically-optimal treatment if he or she felt the benefits were worth the extra 
costs, (2) the patient was aware of the more expensive option and its advantages 
but agreed to the less expensive course,81 and (3) most other physicians would 
 
its financial conflict of interest.  It is for this reason that Clark Havighurst and I propose that insurers 
share some portion of the savings with the patient in such circumstances—for instance, by agreeing to 
pay for the more expensive option if the patient will pay half the difference in cost.  See Hall & 
Havighurst, supra note 63, at 1498. 
 78. See cases cited supra note 72. 
 79. As explained earlier, this is true even though most treatment costs will still be covered by 
insurance because insurance will primarily cover the relatively fewer situations of “catastrophic” costs 
that exceed the high deductible, such as hospitalizations of more than just a few days.  See supra note 4 
and accompanying text. 
 80. E.g., Hall & Anderson, supra note 65. 
 81. In other words, this analysis purposefully avoids the informed consent aspects of the issue, such 
as who should raise the question of cost in considering treatment options and how cost issues should be 
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likely use the more expensive treatment with a fully insured patient under 
similar medical circumstances.  Given these assumptions, the less expensive 
treatment is not clearly within the existing “standard of care,” so there is a 
colorable claim that it is substandard. 
Framed just this way,82 it is open to debate whether physicians would be 
legally safe in delivering the less expensive treatment.  In general, the medical 
malpractice standard of care does not vary according to a patient’s insurance or 
financial situation.83  Moreover, if care is substandard, a waiver of medical 
liability is generally not enforceable due to the fiduciary nature of treatment 
relationships.84  These legal positions have been developed, however, under a 
highly polarized framing of the issues, such as fully insured versus indigent 
patients or full liability versus complete waiver of liability.85  Limited-coverage 
insurance does not typically pose these extremes.  Instead, the legal issues can 
be framed in more qualified terms such as the following: 
(1) Are there any resource-sensitive components of the legal standard of 
care, and if so, how well do they take account of patients’ willingness 
to pay? 
(2) If patients knowingly accept substandard treatment on account of 
costs, do physicians have any defenses to liability, or do they have to 
offer minimally acceptable treatment regardless of patients’ 
willingness to pay? 
These are complex questions that can be viewed from a variety of doctrinal 
perspectives, only some of which are briefly considered here.  On the first 
question, malpractice law takes financial resources into account in only limited 
ways that do not directly recognize the financial circumstances of individual 
patients or their willingness to pay.86  Legal scholars have advanced strong 
 
discussed between patient and physician.  For analysis of this issue, see E. Haavi Morreim, High-
Deductible Health Plans: New Twists on Old Challenges from Tort and Contract, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
1207 (2006). 
 82. This precise combination of legal and medical attributes may not be the most common scenario 
in which liability issues will arise under consumer-driven insurance, but this particular framing helps to 
focus squarely on the legal issues that are uniquely raised by this form of insurance.  See also id. 
(framing and analyzing the issues similarly).  
 83. For older authorities, see Becker v. Janiski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1891), and 
Medical Malpractice in Nineteenth-Century America, DEVILLE, supra note 23, at 183.  For a modern 
analysis, see E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
1719, 1724–25 (1987), and John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice 
Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439, 441 (1991). 
 84. Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 448 (Cal. 1963); Maxwell J. 
Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care 
Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 401–14 (1990); A.M. Swarthout, Annotation, Validity and 
Construction of Contract Exempting Hospital or Doctor from Liability for Negligence to Patient, 6 
A.L.R.3D 704 (1966). 
 85. See, e.g., President and Dirs. of Georgetown Coll. v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1942) 
(rejecting complete immunity for charitable hospitals). 
 86. James H. Henderson & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on 
Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1403 (1994) (noting that courts 
“covertly” adjust the standard of care to resource-dependent professional customs); see also Hall v. 
Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872–73 (Miss. Ct. App. 1985) (considering resources in determining which 
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arguments for and against varying the standard of care based on type of 
insurance,87 but few courts have ever ruled on these arguments.88  They therefore 
remain almost entirely a matter of academic debate.89  Most convincing is the 
argument, made independently in various forms by several different scholars, 
that malpractice law should distinguish between two components of the 
malpractice standard of care: (1) deliberate decisions about how much 
treatment to give a patient (the resource component) and (2) the skill with 
which diagnoses are made and treatment is rendered (the skill component).90  
Currently, the standard of care lumps together these two different components 
of resources and skill and asks only whether the treatment received was up to 
par.  Legal scholars reason, consistent with general principles from case law, 
that although the skill component should not vary by patients’ financial 
circumstances, the resource component should.  Otherwise, law would demand 
more of physicians than is reasonable in the circumstances.91  Whether courts 
will accept this reasoning remains to be seen.92 
 
localities are similar). 
 87. See generally MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, MEDICAL 
LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 324–25 (2005) (surveying various authorities). 
 88. Courts have not faced this issue for several reasons.  One is that defense lawyers are reluctant 
to raise resource constraints as a defense because financial motivation for substandard care would 
likely be used by plaintiffs as a sword, even to the extent of justifying punitive damages.  Id. at 325–26.  
Another is that medical practices in HMOs or other resource-constrained settings do not in fact vary 
much from full-payment settings.  See MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID 
ORENTLICHER, THE LAW OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 220–21 (2005) 
(reviewing empirical studies of HMO impacts). 
 89. Research has turned up only two cases broadly on point.  One suggests financial resources 
should matter and the second holds they should not.  Compare Moss v. Miller, 625 N.E.2d 1044, 1051 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) with Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1384 (D. Mass. 1979), rev’d on other 
grounds, Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).  Neither addresses patient cost-sharing.  Instead, 
they both consider care provided for free by institutions with limited budgets.  The first case reversed a 
defense verdict against a prisoner who alleged negligent failure to refer him to a specialist, reasoning 
that the jury instructions improperly suggested that “those practicing the medical arts in the 
penitentiary are held to [a different] standard of care.”  Moss, 625 N.E.2d at 1051.  The second case, 
however, ruled in a challenge to conditions at a state mental hospital that it was “relevant . . . to 
consider the medical resources and support facilities available” to the psychiatrists at the hospital in 
determining whether they used psychotropic medication reasonably.  Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1384. 
 90. E. HAAVI MORREIM, HOLDING HEALTH CARE ACCOUNTABLE 80–82 (2001); Randall R. 
Bovbjerg & William G. Kopit, Coverage and Care for the Medically Indigent: Public and Private 
Options, 19 IND. L. REV. 857, 916 (1986); Mark A. Hall, Health Care Cost Containment and the 
Stratification of Malpractice Law, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 501–08 (1990); Siliciano, supra note 83, at 482; 
Jonathan J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Containment, 103 YALE L.J. 
1297, 1325–26 (1994). 
 91. See sources cited supra note 90. 
 92. Some support can be found in Hall v. Hilbun, which held that the skill component is uniform 
but that the resource component varies by similar locality.  466 So. 2d 856, 872 (Miss. Ct. App. 1985); 
see also Primus v. Galgano, 329 F.3d 236, 241 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating that it is permissible to consider 
local resources as a relevant circumstance in determining the standard of care under a uniform national 
standard); Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. 1968) (same).  Support is also found in a 
federal statute that adjusts the standard of care according to whether treatment is consistent with 
Medicare payment guidelines while still requiring physicians to “exercise[] due care.”  42 U.S.C. § 
1320c-6(c) (2000); see Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice 
Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 136–40 (Spring 1991) (discussing the statute); Leah S. 
Crothers, Note, Professional Standards Review and the Limitation of Services, 54 B.U. L. REV. 931 
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There is more legal authority addressing the second question—whether 
patients’ informed acceptance of substandard care is a liability defense.  Several 
scholars argue that courts should enforce agreements by patients or their 
representatives to lower the ordinary standard of care.93  They observe that 
altering the standard of care differs from waiving liability entirely, which is 
primarily all that courts have refused to do.94  The general tenor of this 
scholarship, however, is that there is still little or no judicial support for this 
more moderate position.95  This is too narrow a view of the case law.  Again, the 
distinction between deliberate resource decisions and general skill level is 
critical.  Courts are in fact hostile toward using contractual arguments to lower 
the general skill standard below negligence to, say, gross negligence.96  However, 
several lines of doctrine recognize patients’ ability to agree to lower the 
resource standard of care.  If patients refuse treatment entirely, withholding 
care is not only legally permissible,97 it could constitute battery or false 
imprisonment to insist otherwise.  This accounts for the practice of honoring 
patients’ demands to be discharged early from the hospital, even when it is 
against medical advice (AMA).  Frequently, these “discharges AMA” are 
motivated by patients’ concerns about financial responsibility.98 
Another way of stating this principle is that malpractice law recognizes 
assumption of risk as an affirmative defense, and informed refusal of 
recommended treatment is one form of express assumption of risk.99  The same 
principle applies when a patient, rather than refusing treatment, opts for an 
alternative form of treatment that is less expensive.  When there is 
disagreement over whether the course of treatment is consistent with a 
 
(1974) (same). 
 93. E.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort Law Dogma: Market Opportunities and Legal 
Obstacles, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (Spring 1986). 
 94. Some courts have also refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate malpractice disputes, but 
most courts have approved these.  HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 87, at 427. 
 95. See William H. Ginsburg, Steven J. Kahn, Michael C. Thornhill & Steven C. Gambardella, 
Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice Liability, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (Spring 1986) 
(reviewing relevant cases). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Note, though, that some courts require treatment refusals to meet legal standards of informed 
consent.  E.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906–07 (Cal. 1980) (requiring a physician to better 
inform a patient of why she needed a cancer screening test that she refused on multiple occasions). 
 98. Z.Y. Aliyu, Discharge Against Medical Advice: Sociodemographic, Clinical and Financial 
Perspectives, 56 INT’L J. CLINICAL PRACTICE 325 (2002); Patricia Green, Diane Watts, Sabrina Poole 
& Vasant Dhopesh, Why Patients Sign out Against Medical Advice (AMA): Factors Motivating Patients 
to Sign out AMA, 30 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 489 (2004); David B. Smith & Joel L. Telles, 
Discharges Against Medical Advice at Regional Acute Care Hospitals, 81 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 212 
(1991); Saul N. Weingart, Roger B. Davis & Russell S. Phillips, Patients Discharged Against Medical 
Advice from a General Medicine Service, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 568 (1998). 
 99. E.g., Baxley v. Rosenblum, 400 S.E.2d 502, 508 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding assumption-of-
risk instruction when a patient, who also was a physician, refused a treatment option recommended by 
his doctor).  Other examples arise in cases of Jehovah’s Witnesses who refuse blood transfusions.  See 
generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Contributory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, or 
Assumption of Risk, Other than Failing to Reveal Medical History or Follow Instructions, as Defense in 
Action Against Physician or Surgeon for Medical Malpractice, 108 A.L.R.5TH 385 (2005). 
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reasonable standard of care, it is often the case that multiple standards of care 
exist, some of which only a minority of physicians adhere to.  Under the “two 
schools of thought” or “respectable minority” doctrine, physicians are protected 
if their practice is consistent with any acceptable standard of care, even if it is 
not the preferred, best, or most widespread.100  However, these issues of 
reasonableness and professional acceptance usually are given to the jury to 
resolve, leaving physicians in jeopardy of unsympathetic or uninformed juries.101  
One way to remove this uncertainty over the reasonableness of an alternative 
school of thought is to show that the patient knew about the alternatives and 
requested the course that was taken.102  Based on a patient’s informed choice, 
courts have allowed alternatives that objectively are not at all accepted or 
reasonable.103 
One final possibility is that instead of declining more expensive treatment, 
patients might insist on the best treatment but refuse to pay.  When this 
happens, the law is complex and sometimes unclear.  The relevant legal 
principles depend on whether the provider is a physician or hospital, on 
whether treatment has not yet been initiated or is being ended, and on the 
extent of medical urgency in a particular case.104  For some combinations of 
these factors, there are few or no decided cases, so the legal framework is 
uncertain.  Still, several aspects of this complex doctrine allow physicians in 
particular to refuse to treat patients who refuse to pay.105 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Havighurst and Richman catalogue many of the ways in which distributional 
inequities in American health law and policy force people to pay too much for 
health care and insurance.  Their basic insight—that social injustice results from 
requiring everyone to purchase the same level of care preferred by the 
wealthy—is similar to the following point made by health economist Uwe 
Reinhardt twenty years ago: 
 
 100. See James F. Blumsein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing in Assuring Quality, 
Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the Health Care Marketplace?, 11 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 133–34 (2002) (discussing various ways in which the law accommodates 
“medical pluralism”). 
 101. See, for example, the following account by a physician who was sued for following a 
conservative approach to screening for prostate cancer, as recommended by national guidelines.  
Daniel Merenstein, Winners and Losers, 291 JAMA 15, 16 (2004) (“The jury sent a message . . . that 
they didn’t believe in the national guidelines.”). 
 102. Cf., e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 996 (2d Cir. 1987) (signing an informed consent 
form for unorthodox cancer treatment created a jury question regarding patient’s assumption of risk). 
 103. See, e.g., id. at 993 (permitting jury to find that unorthodox treatment was acceptable despite 
testimony that the practitioner was a “quack” and “one of the cruelest killers in the United States”). 
 104. See MARK A. HALL, IRA MARK ELLMAN & DANIEL S. STROUSE, HEALTH CARE LAW AND 
ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 82–115 (2d ed. 1999) (summarizing the governing law). 
 105. Mathew Gregory, Hard Choices: Patient Autonomy in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 
30 JURIMETRICS J. 483, 499 (1990); Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 U. GA. 
L. REV. 511, 528–33 (1997). 
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A remarkable and unique feature of American health policy has been its attempt to 
accommodate simultaneously both the egalitarian and the libertarian theories of 
justice in their extreme purity.  No other nation in the industrialized West has been 
quite so bold, or quite so naive, as to attempt that feat . . . .  There appears to be a 
casual link between schizoid thinking on the ethical plane and impotence at the level 
of policy. 106 
Unlike Reinhardt, however, Havighurst and Richman are less interested in 
making health care truly progressive than in making it more efficient.  
Correcting regressivity is more than just a pretext, however; it is a genuine 
motivator for reform.  Although they refrain from definitive policy 
prescriptions, they at least raise the possibility that both equity and efficiency 
will be enhanced by moving toward consumer-driven health care, embodied 
most straightforwardly in HSAs and high-deductible health insurance. 
This survey reveals that although some legal risks would certainly be 
encountered, there is enough room in regulatory policy and common-law 
precedents to allow this to happen.  Not all aspects of legal doctrine fully 
embrace the principles of consumer-driven health care, but neither are there 
obvious major obstacles.  It has been half a century since the era when most 
people paid for most of their medical costs out of pocket.  Naturally, the law 
that developed over these generations tended to take for granted the 
widespread existence of third-party reimbursement and thus often avoided 
confronting the economic tradeoffs that health care inevitably entails.  Still, the 
common law has not discarded its historical roots.107  It embodies in many ways 
the basic principles that patients should not have to pay for more than they 
receive and that patients of adequate means cannot expect to receive more care 
than they are willing to pay for.  This legal regime may or may not enforce 
society’s concept of a fair system of health care finance and delivery, but it goes 
a long way toward allowing the more limited forms of insurance and the less 
costly standard of medical care that Havighurst and Richman believe many 
consumers would prefer. 
 
 106. Uwe Reinhardt, Chapter 1, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 1, 8 (Frank A. Sloan, James Blumstein & James Perrin eds., 1986). 
 107. For instance, the leading case on a physician’s freedom to refuse patients is a century old.  
Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901) (holding that a physician need not give any justification 
for refusing to treat a patient who subsequently died).  The core of medical malpractice doctrine 
remains largely unchanged from the nineteenth century, other than the locality component of the 
standard of care.  See DEVILLE, supra note 23, at 206–14. 
